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The Official English Movement and the First Amendment
Amy Mackin*
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Tom Tancredo, a Congressman from Colorado and a
Republican presidential candidate devoutly opposed to illegal
immigration, opted to boycott a political debate that was being conducted
in Spanish.' In justifying this decision, he asserted that attending the
debate would be like "encouraging violation of the law.",2 After all, in
order to be a citizen one must learn English,3 and there was presumably
no point for him to engage non-voters in a political debate. He went on
to say that candidates' "pandering" to constituencies that use other
languages contributes to the "Balkanization" of the country, implying
that the use of languages other than English will lead to a nation
comprised of hostile factions.4 His argument seemed to be that when the
government translates information into other languages, immigrants have
no incentive to learn English and thus cannot or will not ever become
citizens. They will thus be a separate class of people living within
United States borders who do not owe allegiance to the government.
Tancredo emphasized that his decision not to attend the debate was based
on the issue of language only, not a rejection of Spanish-speaking people
themselves.5
In fact, the link between the use of English and United States
citizenship status is far from clear. Although there is an English
language requirement for citizenship, it has the following important
. Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009.
1. Stephen Dinan, Tancredo to Boycott Spanish-Language Debate, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at A04, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/
20071205/NATION/i 12050039/1002.
2. Id.
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (2007).
4. Dinan, supra note 1.
5. Id.
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exceptions. People over age fifty who have lived in the United States for
more than twenty years after being lawfully admitted do not have to learn
English. 6  In addition, those people with a "medically determinable
physical or mental impairment, where the impairment affects the
applicant's ability to learn English" are exempt from the requirement.
7
Furthermore, it appears that even people who have to take the test do not
have to meet rigorous fluency standards; the sample test questions
include such simple sentences as, "He has a very big dog," and "We are
very smart to learn this [sic]."'8 Even passing this test, therefore, seems
to be no guarantee that a person can speak the language well enough to
be able to communicate his or her ideas fully in English, particularly
when complex political matters are being discussed. Indeed, census
statistics from 2000 indicate that approximately forty-seven million
people over age five (eighteen percent of the population) speak a
language other than English at home.9 The San Francisco Department of
Elections, for example, reported in 2006 that 20,084 voters there
requested information pamphlets in Chinese, and 3,666 people requested
voter information in Spanish.10 Therefore, it is not at all clear that
citizens participating in the democratic process are truly fluent in
English.
Despite Tancredo's misconception, he is not alone in his
opinions about immigrants. Bumper stickers across the country
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (2007). Parents who intend to raise their children in the
United States could certainly be in the country for twenty years. Since these
children might be citizens and are probably learning English at school, the parents
could be relying on their children for translation if they are unable or unwilling to
learn English.
7. Id.
8. OFF. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, M-
481, Naturalization Study Guide 65 (2006) (alteration added), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/M-476.pdf at 65. Other sentences listed there are,
"I know how to speak English," and "I go to work every day."
9. HYON B. SHIN WITH ROSALIND BRUNO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE
USE AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING ABILITY: 2000 (2003), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf. This publication does not compare language use
with citizenship status.
10. Leslie Fulbright, Campaigns Begin on Voting Rights Act, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., Apr. 7, 2006, at A4. English-speaking voters requested 426,483 pamphlets.
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proclaim, "Welcome to America; Now Speak English"''  Those who
agree with this proposition may be likely to support the Official English
movement (Official English), a campaign to have English named as the
official language of the United States government and then enforced as
such. 1 2  Specifically, Congress is considering a number of bills that
would require federal government employees to use only English in the
workplace. 13 This proposed legislation does not just state that English is
the language used by the government, but instead specifically prohibits
the use of other languages to accomplish governmental tasks.14 It would
therefore also restrict the non-English-speaking public from effectively
accessing governmental services. Rather than setting up programs or
other supports to help people learn English, the law simply cuts them off
from the government. While the efficacy and political wisdom of
Official English laws have been widely debated, 5 the focus of this Note
will be on the constitutional concerns a proposed federal law raises.
Two federal circuit courts have already heard cases about state or
local Official English mandates, reaching different conclusions about
their constitutionality under the First Amendment. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona's constitutional
amendment establishing English as the state's official language was not a
11. This phrase is from a bumper sticker sold at www.stickergiant.com, among
other places. In personal correspondence, a customer service representative
reported that Sticker Giant has sold this bumper sticker since 2000 and that average
sales have been approximately one per day for the past eighteen months. Email from
Dianna in Customer Service, stickerhelp@stickergiant.com (Oct. 12, 2007,
11:39AM EST) (on file with author).
12. For a brief history of the Official English movement, see Carol Schmid,
Comment, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the Public
and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65 (1992).
13. See, e.g., National Language Act of 2007, H.R. 769, S. 1335, 110th Cong.
(2007); English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997, 110th Cong. (2007).
14. "Unless specifically stated in applicable law, no person has a right,
entitlement, or claim to have the Government of the United States or any of its
officials or representatives act, communicate, perform or provide services, or
provide materials in any language other than English." National Language Act of
2007, H.R. 769, at § 163.
15. See generally, ESL IN AMERICA: MYTHS AND POSSIBILITIES, (Sarah
Benesch ed., 1991).
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mere regulation of the manner of speech.1 6 Rather, that circuit held that
the law was facially overbroad on First Amendment grounds, prohibiting
too much protected free speech.17 On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit
found that a city ordinance in Oklahoma that required city employees to
18
speak English at work was not a violation of the First Amendment.
Focusing on the speech rights of government employees, the court held
that their speech was not a matter of public concern that required
constitutional protection.' 9  Furthermore, the court stated that the
employees' choice to use Spanish did not communicate any content in
the first place.20 Although the laws in question in these two cases were
not identical, the differing First Amendment analyses employed by the
two courts indicate that it may be left to the United States Supreme Court
to answer the constitutional questions raised by Official English.
A number of state courts have also heard cases challenging
Official English laws. Two state supreme courts have held state Official
English statutes unconstitutional on different grounds. The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma addressed the issue in a certified question related to
an Official English referendum that would have been sent to voters of
that state. 21 The court there held that the law would violate the freedoms
of speech and petition, was void for vagueness on due process grounds
under the state constitution, and would violate the nondelegation doctrine
22by giving too much legislative discretion to state agencies. The
Supreme Court of Arizona also found its state's Official English
constitutional amendment invalid under the United States Constitution
based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.23
Official English laws have fared better in other states, however.
In Utah, a state district court distinguished the Utah law from broader
formulations of Official English, holding that the law was constitutional
16. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 935-36 (9th Cir.
1995).
17. Id. at 947.
18. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1313 (2006).
19. Id. at 1310-13.
20. Id. at 1311.
21. In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d 123 (Okla. 2002).
22. Id. at 127-29.
23. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 987 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc); cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1093 (1999).
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because it did not make non-English communication unlawful.24  In
2002, an Alaskan superior court considered two consolidated cases and
held that there was no showing of either a legitimate governmental
purpose for the Official English law or a burden on government
efficiency arising from public employees' use of languages other than
English.25  Even though the voters of Alaska had passed that law by
referendum, the superior court held that it was so poorly drafted that it
26
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. On appeal in 2007,
however, the Supreme Court of Alaska agreed that the law was
unconstitutional as written, but held that the offending portions could be
severed to make the law otherwise enforceable. 27 These state cases could
provide persuasive authority to federal courts when they are forced to
rule on the constitutionality of Official English.
This Note will argue that the proposed federal Official English
law does indeed pose a significant threat to First Amendment freedoms.
Part I describes the current legal framework for analyzing Official
English. It details the pending congressional legislation and summarizes
the federal circuit split on the relevant First Amendment questions. Part
II identifies the assumptions behind this Note and predicts the possible
impacts of an Official English law on the freedom of speech. Part III
discusses how courts could analyze the law under the First Amendment
28
as it affects both private citizens and federal government employees.
This Note concludes that because the law burdens the freedom of speech
necessary for democratic processes, the Court should find it
unconstitutional under that framework.
24. Alvarez v. State of Utah, Memorandum Decision, Case No. 000909680
(Utah 3d Dist. 2001).
25. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183 (Ariz.
2007). The Alaskan plaintiffs spoke Yupik, an indigenous Alaskan tribal language.
The law in Alaska thus implicated protection for Native American languages in
addition to First Amendment concerns.
26. Id. at 215.
27. Id. at 215-16.
28. A federal Official English law would bind federal employees in the same
way that comparable state laws have affected state employees.
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I. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Proposed Legislation
Congress has recently considered a number of bills related to
Official English. The National Language Act of 200729 would not only
declare English to be the national language for all official government
activities,30 but would also explicitly repeal the bilingual voting
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.31 This bill would also require the
exclusive use of English in ceremonies in which people become United
32States citizens. Its limited exceptions would allow use of foreign
languages for religious or educational purposes where necessary. 33 The
bill strongly equates the use of English with the marks of United States
citizenship, as two of its three primary provisions require English for
naturalization ceremonies and voting. 34 Similarly, the English Language
Unity Act of 2007, 35 creates in the federal government "an affirmative
obligation to preserve and enhance the role of English as the official
language" of the government.36 Although the bill also specifies that all
"official" government functions must be conducted in English, it allows
exceptions for government activities related to language education,
29. National Language Act of 2007, H.R. 769, 110th Cong. (2007).
30. "The Government of the United States shall conduct its official business in
English, including publications, income tax forms, and informational materials." Id.
at § 2(a), proposing an amendment at 4 U.S.C. § 162.
31. Id. § 3(a)(1).
32. Id. § 4, amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to include the
sentence, "All public ceremonies in which the oath of allegiance is administered
pursuant to this section shall be conducted solely in the English language."
33. Id. § 2(a), proposing an amendment at 4 U.S.C. § 164 to make exceptions
to the English language requirement "for religious purposes; for training in foreign
languages for international communication; or to [sic] programs in schools designed
to encourage students to learn foreign languages."
34. Id. There are only three substantive provisions to the bill: one that declares
English the official language, one that repeals the Voting Rights Act, and one that
requires English-only naturalization ceremonies. Two of these three sections
address matters squarely related to citizenship-naturalization and voting.
35. English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997, 110th Cong. (2007).
36. Id. § 3, proposing an amendment at 4 U.S.C. § 162.
special education, national security, international trade, tourism, public
health, census forms, and criminal proceedings.37
The third bill is a response to Executive Order 13166, issued by
President Bill Clinton in 2000, which was entitled "Improving Access to
Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency [LEP]." '38 That
order mandated that "each Federal agency shall examine the services it
provides and develop and implement a system by which LEP persons can
meaningfully access those services consistent with, and without unduly
burdening, the fundamental mission of the agency. 39  In response,
Congress is considering a bill 4° that would nullify this Executive Order
and prohibit use of any funds to support services provided in foreign
languages pursuant to such an order. 41 Finally, House Joint Resolution
4219, sponsored by Representative Tancredo, proposes an amendment to
the United States Constitution to name English as the nation's official
language and give Congress authority to pass legislation to enforce the
amendment.43
The complicated provisions of several of these proposed bills are
in sharp contrast with some of the older state statutes that established
English as the official languages of those states. 4 In 1987, for example,
37. Id., proposing an amendment at 4 U.S.C. § 163.
38. 65 Fed. Reg. 159 (Aug. 16, 2000) (alteration added).
39. Id. at 3.
40. H.R. 768, 110th Cong. (2007).
41. If Executive Order 13166 did in fact create an entitlement for translation
into other languages, there could be a due process challenge to that right being taken
away. President Clinton characterized hostility towards foreign languages as a
possible form of discrimination based on national origin, a classification that would
warrant heightened judicial review if challenged on Equal Protection grounds. See
generally, Note, "Official English ": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual
Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345 (1987).
42. See supra, note 1.
43. H.R.J. Res. 19, 110th Cong. (2007). An amendment to the United States
Constitution that established English as the national language would obviously
change the constitutional analysis of Official English. Securing approval from two-
thirds of the states for such an amendment would be challenging, though. This Note
presumes that, because a law could be passed more easily than an amendment, the
courts will probably consider a law first.
44. See, eg., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/20 (2007); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 145-10.1
(2006). The Seventh Circuit has held that the Illinois statute simply naming English
as the state's official language did not "prevent publication of official materials in
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the North Carolina General Assembly established English as the official
state language in one sentence 45 and in the same chapter that it
46established the cardinal as the state bird and milk as the state beverage.
Stating that English is the official language is more of a truism in such a
statute, not explicitly creating the considerable duties and limitations that
the current congressional proposals would place on the government and
the public. Not all Official English statutes are created equal, and the
ones Congress is currently considering are more expansive and far-
reaching than the nominal pronouncements in some state statutes.
Because the proposed laws would place more limits on the speech of
both government employees and those interacting with the government,
they also pose more pressing First Amendment questions for courts.
B. The Circuit Split: The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit case Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English
is the only case involving Official English to have reached the United
States Supreme Court, where it was eventually decided on procedural
• 47
rather than substantive grounds, avoiding the constitutional question.
The facts, arguments, and various court opinions in this case, however,
are illustrative of the issues circulating around the Official English law.
Plaintiff Maria-Kelly Yniguez was a bilingual employee of the Arizona
Department of Administration, and she had routinely used both English
and Spanish to communicate with members of the public who were
48
claiming medical malpractice against state entities. After Arizona
voters amended their Constitution by referendum to make English the
other languages." Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575,
577 (7th Cir. 1973).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-12(b) (2006).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-2 and § 145-10.1 (2006).
47. 520 U.S. 43, 48-49 (1997) (dismissing the case for mootness).
48. 42 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1994). This citation represents the third time
the case was considered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the first decision,
the court reversed the district court's decision preventing Arizonans for Official
English from intervening in the case. 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991). In the second
decision, the court dismissed the state's claim of mootness, even though Ms. Yniguez
had resigned from government employment. 975 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1992). After
the third holding cited here, the Court of Appeals issued an en banc opinion at 69
F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), which will be addressed later in this Note.
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official language of the state, Ms. Yniguez immediately stopped using
Spanish at work to avoid an employee sanction for violating the Arizona
Constitution. 9 She then filed an action in federal court against various
state officials to enjoin enforcement of the provision and to declare the
50law unconstitutional on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
Eventually State Senator Jaime Gutierrez joined Yniguez's complaint,
stating that he could no longer communicate with his Spanish-speaking
constituents without fear of being sued. 51 The district court granted
declaratory relief, finding that the amendment was facially overbroad
52based on First Amendment standards. When the Arizona state
government did not appeal this decision, "Arizonans for Official
English," the primary proponent of the referendum that had resulted in
the amendment, intervened to carry the case forward.
53
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
the Arizona amendment was broader in its scope than its counterparts in
other states 54 and then went on to conclude that there was no acceptable
limiting construction that could save it.55 To be overly broad in the
freedom of speech context, the court said, the law must create a
significant number of situations in which speech that is protected by the
56First Amendment would be illegal. The court later concluded in its en
banc opinion that the amendment "applie[d] to speech in a seemingly
limitless variety of governmental settings" and affected the speech rights
49. Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1221.
50. Id. at 1221-22. She also claimed a violation of the federal civil rights
statutes.
51. Id. at 1222. His claim was later dismissed at the District Court level,
because as a legislator he was immune from prosecution by the executive branch and
thus there was no real threat that he would be sued over his choice of language. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1223.
54. See id. at 1243-44. It is much closer in substance to H.R. 997, the English
Language Unity Act of 2007, than to the North Carolina statute, § 145-12(b).
55. Id. at 1225.
56. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (stating
that a plaintiff must show from the text of a law "and from actual fact that a
substantial number of instances exist in which the Law cannot be applied
constitutionally"). This concept will be discussed in more detail in Section III of this
Note.
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of both governmental employees and constituents.57 The court rejected
the assertions of Arizonans for Official English that the law was either
expressive conduct or a mere regulation of the manner of speech. 58 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Yniguez, but then dismissed for
mootness and vacated the judgment without deciding the constitutional
question. 59 In dicta, however, the Court noted that the lower courts'
shared conclusion that the federal courts' conclusion that the law was
unconstitutional on its face was "all the more puzzling in view of the
[limiting construction] the initiative sponsors advanced., 60 Arguably, the
Court was expressing willingness to consider this limited construction
that might have saved the Arizona Official English law from the federal
court's holding that it was unconstitutional.
After the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's rejection of
the Official English amendment, another plaintiff challenged it. The
Arizona Supreme Court eventually found it unconstitutional based on the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.61
Nonetheless, in 2006, voters in Arizona adopted a new form of the
amendment by referendum as Proposition 103, so Arizona remains a
62
critical site for the Official English debate. The new amendment
57. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir.
1995) (en banc) (alteration added). The plaintiff in Yniguez was a government
employee, so a full analysis of the effect on constituents was beyond the scope of
that court's inquiry.
58. Id. at 935-36, n.21.
59. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 48-49 (1997)
(finding mootness because Ms. Yniguez had resigned from government
employment). The Court also noted that the federal court should not have
definitively interpreted this novel state law issue without certifying the question to
the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 77. This jurisdictional problem would not be
relevant to federal courts ruling on a federal Official English law.
60. Id. at 77-78 (alterations added). The Arizona Attorney General had
previously declared that he would interpret the amendment in light of the rest of the
Arizona Constitution, the United States Constitution, and relevant federal law. Id. at
52. His resulting construction would supposedly have allowed bilingual state
employees to use languages other than English "to facilitate the delivery of
governmental services." Id.
61. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093
(1999).
62. The text, legislative analysis, and arguments for and against Proposition
103 are available from the Arizona Secretary of State website at
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/lnfo/PubPamphlet/english/Prop 103.htm.
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contains more specific exceptions for when state employees can use
languages other than English, noting public education, special education,
criminal justice, public health, commerce, and tourism, among others. 63
It also states that the amendment "shall not be construed to prohibit any
representative of government, including a member of the legislature,
while performing official duties, from communicating unofficially
through any medium with another person in a language other than
English if official action is conducted in English., 64 In addition, "official
action" is now explicitly defined to include "any function or action on
behalf of this state .. . that appears to present the views, position or
imprimatur of the state or political subdivision or that binds or commits
,,65the state or political subdivision. These clarifications may offer a
limiting construction that would alter the Arizona courts' previous
analysis of the Official English law.
C. The Circuit Split: The Tenth Circuit
Nearly a decade after Yniguez, in Maldonado v. City of Altus,
bilingual city employees sued the City of Altus, Oklahoma, over its
English-only workplace policy, claiming violation of the federal civil
rights laws, the Equal Protection clause, and the First Amendment. 66 In
Maldonado, employees had been using both English and Spanish at work
until someone complained about not being able to understand the
67employees' communications over the city's radio devices. Shortly
thereafter, the city passed an official policy requiring all of its employees
to speak only English for "all work related and business communications
during the work day.., with the exception of those circumstances where
it is necessary or prudent to communicate with a citizen, business owner,
organization or criminal suspect in his or her native language."68 The
policy also exempted private communications between co-workers or
63. Id. The current version of the Arizona Constitution, including Article
XXVIII, is available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/const/ArizonaConstitution.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 433 F.3d 1294, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 2006).
67. Id. at 1298.
68. Id. at 1299. Note that the ordinance classified people in the community as
citizens or criminals. The policy could have simply said "person."
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others during work breaks. 69 Although the stated purposes of the policy
were to improve communication over the radios, help employees who
only spoke English not to feel excluded, and ensure safety around heavy
70
equipment, the city offered no written record of any such problems. In
addition, the employees alleged that their supervisors expanded the
policy in practice, prohibiting "all use of Spanish if a non-Spanish
speaker was present, even during breaks, lunch hours, and private phone
conversations.",71 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
72
of the city on all of the employees' claims.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a number of
the grants of summary judgment on the grounds that there were still
questions of fact to be resolved about whether the policy created a hostile
work environment,73 whether the policy was necessary for conducting
the city's business,74 and whether the city had intended to discriminate
against the employees.75 As to the First Amendment issue, however, the
76
Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs claim. The
plaintiffs' complaint was that the rule violated their right of free
expression, because speaking Spanish was an expression of ethnic pride
that was the equivalent of wearing a "Proud to Be Hispanic" shirt.7 7 The
court held that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs actually intended
to convey that message through their choice of language here.78 The
dissent noted, however, that the racially-charged climate of the city gave
meaning to the use of Spanish.79 In fact, the employees had written a
letter to the city when the policy was first passed, complaining that the
rule was "issued to restrict hispanics [sic] from expressing our heritage
by speaking our native language to each other. This evidence reveals
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1300.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1302.
73. Id. at 1306.
74. Id. at 1307.
75. Id. at 1307-08. These issues related to the plaintiffs' Title VII claims under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
76. Id. at 1310.
77. Id. at 1311.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1323-4 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 1320 (alteration added).
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that the plaintiffs did in fact view their choice of language as a message
in itself.
The court also held that the city could reasonably restrict the
expression of its employees at work, noting that the communication here
was not a matter of public concern and thus did not warrant protection.8 1
The court distinguished the Ninth Circuit's holding in Yniguez by
pointing to the city's exception that would allow employees to speak to
82the public in other languages when necessary. Since the city's policy,
unlike the Arizona amendment, did not burden the public, the court
focused its analysis on the policy's validity as a government workplace
regulation. The court also noted the lack of evidence that the plaintiffs
intended to communicate content merely by choosing to speak in Spanish
and sidestepped the plaintiffs' contention that "one's choice of a native
tongue is considered 'symbolic speech' or 'pure speech."' 83 The Tenth
Circuit noted that the case would be different if the employees had
shown intent to communicate a particular message by using Spanish, but
the court was able to avoid that issue by minimizing the expressive value
84of language choice. Thus, although the law itself and therefore the
scope of the inquiry in Maldonado were more narrow than those in
Yniguez, the court in Maldonado was able to completely dismiss the
plaintiffs' First Amendment challenges of the Official English policy. In
Yniguez, however, the law actually failed on First Amendment grounds,
where the court arguably took a more protective stance on the right of
freedom of speech.
II. THE BIG PICTURE: SETTING A BACKGROUND FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS
A. Disclosure ofAssumptions
As discussed, the proposed federal Official English laws prohibit
government employees from communicating in languages other than
English while performing official functions. This Note assumes that
81. Id. at 1313.
82. Id. at 1312.
83. Id. at 1311 (citing Latino Officers Ass'n v. City of New York, 196 F.3d
458, 466 (2d Cir. 1999)).
84. Id. at 1312.
2008]
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government employees would have to conduct all their interactions at
work in English and would not be obligated to translate for people who
cannot speak English.85 Based on Official English supporter websites,
this assumption is fully in line with their vision for a federal law that
would end the "language entitlement" created when people expect the
86
government to understand them in any language they speak. In
addition, because public debate often focuses on the growing number of
Spanish speakers in the United States, 87 this Note will periodically
emphasize the law's burden on that group. Any language other than
English, however, would be similarly restricted under this law.88 In
order to streamline the discussion, this Note will focus mainly on the
English Language Unity Act of 200789 as a sample bill, referring to it
generically as the "Official English law."
85. Although it is possible to imagine a bilingual employee listening to a
request in another language, then responding in English, this sort of stilted
interaction would generally not provide effective service to the public. Furthermore,
if such a situation were effective, the claimed incentive to learn English would be
weakened.
86. ProEnglish at www.proenglish.org and U.S. English at www.us-
english.org.
87. Between the 1990 and 2000 censuses, the percentage of people in America
who reported speaking Spanish as their primary language at home increased 62%,
corresponding to over 28 million people. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at 7.
88. There may be limits on how many languages the government might ever be
asked to accommodate. The language of Executive Order 13166 seems to suggest a
"reasonableness" standard here. This standard could involve a threshold finding that
a significant number of people present in the United States speak that language in
order to trigger a governmental responsibility to provide that particular translation.
This Note focuses on Spanish as a language that is already widely spoken and
currently accommodated in many government contexts.
89. English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997. The law would require
that "official functions of the Government of the United States shall be conducted in
English," where "official" refers to "any function that binds the Government, is
required by law, or is otherwise subject to scrutiny by either the press or the public."
Exceptions may be created in the areas of education, special education, trade,
national security, public health, criminal proceedings, and the census. All
naturalization ceremonies would have to be in English, and all new citizens "should
be able to read and understand generally the English language text of the Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and the laws of the United States made in
pursuance of the Constitution."
B. Potential Impact of the Legislation
An Official English law would burden the freedom of speech of
both government employees and the American public. It is not just a
regulation of the manner of speech, but rather a suppression of certain
voices from the public dialogue. To suggest that citizens can freely
communicate their ideas and needs to the government, but only in a
language that they don't speak, provides little protection to their freedom
of speech. Similarly, the government is not effectively communicating
with the public when it knows that significant portions of the population
will not be able to receive a particular message if it is only provided in
English.90 The proposed Official English law may not restrict the
content of an individual message, but by excluding particular groups of
people from sending and receiving messages with the government, it
eliminates whatever content those groups might provide. It therefore
censors ideas by silencing certain groups of people.
An Official English law would also burden government
employees. Under the proposed law, the government would be required
to use English for all of its "official" communications, either verbal or
written.9 1 Although government employees would have to use English in
their official work functions, they could speak other languages for non-
official matters.92 A member of Congress could speak Spanish to a
constituent, for example, but the listener would probably not be entitled
to rely on the information provided in that conversation as being official
government information.93  Multilingual government employees would
90. One dissenter in Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920,
959 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, C.J., concurring in dissent), commented that the
majority could not identify particular content that would be disallowed under the
Official English law. This argument is a corollary to the idea that Official English is
simply a regulation of the mode of expression. It ignores the fact that the
government is well aware that there are people in the United States who do not speak
English and therefore will not receive whatever messages it decides to send.
91. English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997.
92. The distinction between "official" and "non-official" is not entirely clear,
as will be described below. In addition, as seen in Maldonado, the policy might
inappropriately be enforced against personal communications.
93. Some criminal statutes, for example, allow a defense of mistake if a person
relied on an official statement of law and then committed a criminal act in ignorance
of the law. To such a defendant, it would be important to know whether a
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thus likely find themselves in the same situation as Maria-Kelly
Yniguez. 94  Although these employees would be able to express
themselves in English to the fullest extent possible under the law, there
would nonetheless be entire groups of people with whom they would not
be allowed to communicate at all-groups defined by the languages that
they speak.
Furthermore, important questions remain about the scope of an
Official English law, and these questions could require litigation. Would
government contract recipients also be required to speak English? If a
private firm is constructing a building for the government, must its
employees speak English on the job site? Would the government no
longer want to hire bilingual employees for certain jobs if there were a
strong possibility that they might be tempted to use a language other than
English? Would a bilingual President be allowed to speak another
language when visiting with dignitaries from other countries? Perhaps
the most important question is why Congress would want to limit
bilingual government employees in this way.
The impact on citizens and other members of the American
public is even more problematic. The apparent assumption behind the
law is that people can and should assimilate to American culture by
learning English.95 Forcing people to communicate in a language in
which they are not fluent, however, opens up the possibility that they will
inadvertently misinform the government about matters such as income
tax liability and eligibility for government programs. 96  On a more
fundamental level, citizens may not be able to communicate their
political views directly to the government. The law burdens anyone who
government employee was providing official information or not. See, e.g., People v.
Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987). For a philosophical discussion on English
language versions of documents preempting versions in other languages, see Paul
Conor Hale, Official, National, Common or Unifying: Do Words Giving Legal Status
to Language Diminish Linguistic Human Rights?, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 221
(Fall 2007).
94. See supra note 48.
95. H.R. 997, the English Language Unity Act of 2007, contains the finding,
"Throughout the history of the United States, the common thread binding individuals
of differing backgrounds has been the English language" at § 2.
96. See, e.g., Dicicco v. U.S. Dept. of Justice I.N.S., 873 F.2d 910 (Mich.
1989) (denying citizenship to an Italian-American who had inadvertently waived his
claim of naturalization by filling out an army discharge application in English).
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has not learned English, citizens and non-citizens alike. Furthermore, it
does not consider the structural barriers to learning English, such as
disability, lack of educational opportunities, and the challenges inherent
in learning a second language as an adult.97
Because the proposed legislation would allow exceptions as
previously described, it places discretion in public employees about
when other languages might be used. For example, agencies charged
with a public health mission will sometimes be allowed to translate
98
materials into Spanish. With this choice comes discretion about when
non-English speakers should receive certain information. One
administrator may believe in translation of every document, while
another may only order translation of materials that he or she personally
considers significant. Either way citizens could not expect similar
treatment whenever decisions like this one are made in different field
offices throughout the country. Similarly, some supervisors may enforce
the English-only policy strictly against their employees, perhaps even
using it as grounds for discharge, while other supervisors might be more
amenable to deviations from the policy.99
A concurring judge in Yniguez noted that non-English speakers
in the United States are typically uneducated and living in poverty, 00 and
these individuals are the ones targeted by the Official English law. He
imagined the following scenarios in which the law would burden
underprivileged people:
Bilingual government clerks would not be able to
advise persons who can speak only Spanish-or
Chinese or Navajo-how to apply for food stamps,
or aid for their children, or unemployment or
disability benefits. Public employees would be
97. See generally RICHARD A. OREM, TEACHING ADULT ENGLISH LANGUAGE
LEARNERS (Krieger Publishing Co. 2005).
98. H.R. 997, the English Language Unity Act of 2007, does not require the
use of English for "actions or documents that protect the public health and safety," a
loose standard that might be interpreted differently by different people.
99. See, e.g., Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 732
(2003) (noting that where authority to implement a policy "rests with individual
supervisors, it leaves employees open to discretionary and possibly unequal
treatment").
100. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 952 (9th Cir.
1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially).
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prohibited from helping non-English speaking
residents file complaints against those who mistreat
them or who violate their rights or even from
helping them secure driver's licenses or permits to
open small businesses. Bilingual traffic officers
would not be able to give directions to nearby
medical clinics or schools. Migrant farm workers
who cannot speak English would find themselves
cut off from almost all government assistance by an
impenetrable language barrier.' 0
Perhaps supporters of Official English do not believe that the
government should provide these sorts of public benefits to anyone, or
maybe just not to immigrants or other non-citizens. If so, they could
lobby Congress for immigration or other reform rather than proposing an
overly-inclusive language law poised to harm citizens and non-citizens
alike.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
To assess the constitutionality of Official English legislation, the
Supreme Court could apply a number of First Amendment tests.
Supporters of the law may defend it as a content-neutral regulation of theS 102
manner of speech in the government workplace, while opponents
would likely consider it a burden on freedom of speech and ultimately on
the democratic process. This section will analyze each component of this
argument in turn. Ultimately, proponents of Official English will want
the Court to classify this law in such a way as to require less judicial
scrutiny-because it is, for example, a reasonable "time, place, or
manner" regulation or merely a workplace policy for which the
government as an employer deserves deference. Those who oppose the
law, on the other hand, will want it to be strictly scrutinized as a violation
of the First Amendment freedom of speech and a burden on the
democratic process. 103
101. Id. at 952-953.
102. See, e.g., id. at 957 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
103. The law might also require strict scrutiny for violating the 14th
Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection (i.e., discrimination
based on national origin). These arguments are beyond the scope of this Note. See
L OST WITHO UT TRANSLA TION 359
.20081
A. Is the law content neutral?
A content-neutral law is one that, on its face, does not
distinguish between different communications based on the messages
they convey. 104 A law that prohibited all billboards, for example, would
be a content-neutral law affecting speech-all people and all content
would be treated equally. Laws validly classified as "time, place, or
manner" restrictions should always be content neutral, as described in
Section III(B) of this Note. The courts will uphold these laws as long as
"the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of [an important or substantial
governmental] interest."'' 0 5 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that
"[c]ontent-based regulations [of speech] are presumptively invalid."'
10 6
The basic idea behind a law may be content neutral, but when it
is riddled with exceptions, its apparent content neutrality might fade.
10 7
For example, a simple law stating that English is the official language of
a state or country appears to be content neutral. When the law allows
exceptions in areas such as education, public health, and national
security, however, it becomes more likely that a particular speech context
is being targeted. In this case, for example, it appears that the
naturalization and voting processes are conspicuously absent from the
list of exceptions to the Official English law. 108 In fact, the English
language requirement for naturalization is apparently strengthened by
this proposed law, which would explicitly require new citizens to
understand the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution in
English, not just simple sentences.109
generally, Note, "Official English ": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual
Services in the States, supra note 41.
104. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968) (holding that a law
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was content neutral because it punished any
such desecration, regardless of the individual's motive in destroying his card).
105. Id. at 377 (alterations in original).
106. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (striking down a hate
crime ordinance because it discriminated based on content of the message)
(alterations added).
107. I thank Professor Hugh Stevens for this insight.
108. English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997, at § 3, amending 4
U.S.C. § 163(c).
109. Id, amending § 164.
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Choosing to speak a particular language can in itself be a source
of content-based expression. In Asian American Business Group v. City
of Pomona,1'0 the district court for the Central District of California
invalidated a city ordinance requiring that any sign that contained foreign
language characters have at least half of the sign's space use English
characters. In its discussion of freedom of speech, the court noted
specifically that "[s]ince the language used is an expression of national
origin, culture and ethnicity, regulation of... language is a regulation of
content." I I The court found that the city's stated purpose of facilitating
the reporting of and response to emergencies was valid, but that the
means were not narrowly tailored to meet that purpose. The fact that the
ordinance targeted signs in foreign language but did not require signs in
English to be clearly visible "casts suspicion on the genuineness of said
stated interest."' 12 The court here showed its willingness to look beyond
the government's asserted purpose for the law.
The defendants in Yniguezl 13 tried to assert that speaking a
foreign language was mere conduct, not content-based speech, and thus
less worthy of protection under the First Amendment. In its various
opinions, however, the Ninth Circuit disregarded that argument, noting
that people do not move their vocal cords for their own sake, but rather
to communicate ideas. In its opinion, the court stated that "language is
by definition speech, and the regulation of language is the regulation of
speech."" 14 According to the court, although the choice of language may
certainly reflect a person's feelings about his or her cultural heritage, it
also allows a person to express meaning in a particular way and reach a
particular group of listeners.'15 Choice of language therefore relates
directly to the content of the speech, not just its form.
The Tenth Circuit, however, did not accept the argument that
choice of language alone inherently expresses content. 1 6 It would have
required a specific showing of intent to communicate a particular
110. 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
111. Id. at 1330 (alteration added).
112. Id. at 1331.
113. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir.
1994).
114. Id. at 1231.
115. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 935 (1995).
116. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1311 (10th Cir. 2006).
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message to a particular audience in order to make that claim."'
Interestingly, a dissenter in Yniguez, voting in favor of the law, actually
argued that Official English is a content-based regulation, but that it was
the government's message, not the individual's, that had to be
protected.118  Perhaps the integrity of the message could be "lost in
translation,"1 19 though it is significant that the record contained no
evidence that a government message had ever been misunderstood after
being translated.
Simply framing the issue in terms that appear content neutral
will not necessarily save an Official English law. In Burk v. Augusta-
Richmond County, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a• • 120
regulation requiring permits for political protests was unconstitutional.
The defendants in that case attempted to argue that since all political
speech was subject to the regulation, the law was content neutral.' 21 The
court responded by stating that this argument "misses the mark
completely," as the problem with the law was that it favored non-
political speech over political speech. 122 It was therefore irrelevant that
all political speech was included in the restriction. Similarly, under the
proposed Official English law, the fact that all foreign language
communications would be illegal for all government employees would
not mean that the law is content neutral. Just because the law applies
widely to different ethnic groups does not change the ultimate burden it
places on certain individuals and not others.
There are a number of different analytical approaches to the
issue of content neutrality. One such approach is articulated by the
dissenters in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
including Justices Scalia and Thomas. 123 National Treasury involved a
117. Id. at 1312.
118. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Although he
acknowledged that the law was content based, he did not follow through to give it
heightened scrutiny.
119. Id. at 957 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government "may
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted"). The words in quotations do not appear in this dissent, but are used only
as a figure of speech.
120. 365 F.3d 1247 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
121. Id. at 1251.
122. Id. at 1251, n.6.
123. 513 U.S. 454, 489 (1995) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent).
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law that prohibited government employees from accepting honoraria for
giving speeches, and the dissent characterized it as being content neutral
because all employees were equally affected by the restriction. 24 Using
this logic, because an Official English law would apply to all government
employees at all times, it is content neutral on its face. This argument,
however, is less than satisfactory in the Official English context, because
here only the rights of bilingual government employees are compromised
by the law. If the Court nevertheless accepts that the law is content
neutral, it might proceed to characterize it as a "time, place, manner"
regulation or simply a workplace matter as described below, requiring
less scrutiny in either case. A final consideration would still be whether
the law impermissibly burdens the democratic process, an issue that will
be taken up in Section III(C) of this Note.
In Burson v. Freeman, Justice Kennedy summarized another
approach to content neutrality in his concurring opinion.125  He
emphasized that content neutrality is the primary inquiry in a freedom of
speech case, and by looking for a compelling government purpose and
narrow means, the Court can determine if a law is in fact content
neutral. 126 In other words, by analyzing the government's stated purpose
and whether the chosen means actually achieve that purpose, the Court
can determine whether that purpose is sincere and adequately justifies
infringing the freedom of speech.12 7 Justice Kennedy went on to say that
"there is a narrow area in which the First Amendment permits freedom of
expression to yield to the extent necessary for the accommodation of
another constitutional right."'' 28 This approach would therefore seem to
look for a constitutional interest on the government side in order to
justify a content-based infringement of the freedom of speech, and
workplace efficiency is unlikely to qualify as a constitutional interest.
124. Id.
125. 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a law prohibiting the distribution
of campaign literature within one hundred feet of a polling place was constitutional).
126. Id. at 213.
127. The next section of this Note will engage in precisely that type of
analysis, which was also employed by the court in Asian American Business Group
v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
128. 504 U.S. at 213.
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In yet another concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy was even
more specific about this approach to analyzing laws under the First
Amendment:
[A] law is directed to speech alone where the
speech in question is not obscene, not defamatory,
not words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal,
not an impairment of some other constitutional
right, not an incitement to lawless action, and not
calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm
the State has the substantive power to prevent. No
fuirther inquiry is necessary to reject the State's
argument that the statute should be upheld."'
None of these exceptions appear to apply to Official English, so it seems
likely that those who follow this approach would conclude that the law
should be rejected.
In summary, the Official English law cannot fairly be described
as content neutral, since it excludes certain groups of people from public
interaction with the government. If a court finds that the law
discriminates based on the content of speech, as it should, it must apply
the presumption of invalidity mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Should the Court make this conclusion, only a significant and compelling
governmental interest, perhaps rising to the level of a constitutional
concern, would warrant a government interference with the freedom of
speech. If a court were somehow to deem the Official English law
content neutral, though, it must also find the law acceptable under the
other standards described below.
B. Is the law just a regulation of the manner of speech?
Even if the Court decides that the Official English law is content
neutral and only regulates the "time, place, or manner" of speech rather
129. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority
that the New York "Son of Sam" law that prohibited criminals from receiving profits
from books about their crimes was unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
Justices Stevens, Scalia and Souter joined in the majority opinion in this case, while
Justice Thomas took no part in considering it. The Court held that the Son of Sam
law failed for overinclusiveness without having to address content neutrality.
3632008] LOST WITHOUT TRANSLATION
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
than its content, it must still analyze whether the law unreasonably
burdens the freedom of speech. 30 For example, a law that would allow
groups of people to speak in a public park only on one particular day, say
February 29, would appear to be content neutral, but would still be an
unreasonable burden on the freedom of speech. The inquiry for such a
"time, place, or manner" law is whether the regulation (1) is reasonable
on its face, (2) is narrowly tailored for a significant state purpose, and (3)
leaves other means of communication open. 13 2 Again, before applying
the test, it must be clear that the regulation is content neutral, a debatable
presumption for Official English as discussed in Section III(A) of this
Note. Because the law effectively silences and excludes certain groups
of people, along with their ideas about their station in life, it should not
be considered a benign "time, place, or manner" regulation like a noise
ordinance.
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court emphasized that the
regulation's purpose is the "controlling consideration" and that the
inquiry should focus first on "whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys."133 In other words, the regulation must be "justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech. 134 The core analysis
thus appears to focus on the second step of the Ward test: whether there
is a significant government interest and narrowly-tailored means. 135 In
this and other areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the inquiry into a
law's purpose can be problematic. 36 Must it be the primary purpose, or
is any conceivable neutral purpose enough to justify a law? Should the
130. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding a noise
ordinance as a content-neutral regulation affecting only the manner of expression).
This case is a often-cited example of a quintessentially valid "time, place, or
manner" restriction.
131. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Professor Hugh Stevens in
providing this example.
132. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
135. Id.
136. See, eg., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) (attempting
to determine if a secular motive was present in a state law requiring creationism to
be taught along with evolution).
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Court blind itself to the effects of a law that the legislature could clearly
anticipate when passing it? Does such knowledge imply intention?
1 37
The Court has held that if a law is so broad that it eclipses the reasons
offered to justify it, an impermissible animus for a particular group could
become apparent. 138
Proponents of the bill focus on the financial and logistical burden
that the government must bear in having to translate materials into other
languages, the convenience of everyone speaking the same language, and
the traditional use of English in America. 139 The financial obligation on
the government when it has to translate materials into foreign languages
is undeniable, and those costs will be passed on to the taxpayer. Surely a
goal of reducing the administrative burden on government operations is a
valid one, though convenience or efficiency alone will generally not
justify a constitutional violation. 140
Furthermore, this purported goal is not well served by an Official
English law that allows numerous and expansive exceptions. Under the
English Language Unity Act, for example, the government would still be
allowed to translate materials into other languages for purposes of public
health, education, criminal defendants' or victims' protection, national
137. The Supreme Court's analysis of school integration cases raises these very
questions. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Col., 413 U.S. 189 (1973)
(using evidence of school segregation to shift the burden to the defendant school
system to disprove intent); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1 (1971) (noting that a pattern of school construction that results in segregated
schools can imply an impermissible purpose).
138. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a law was
invalid, even under rational basis review, because it was apparently motivated by
animus for homosexuals as a group).
139. See JUAN CARTAGENA, English Only in the 1980s: A Product of Myths,
Phobias, and Bias, in ESL IN AMERICA: MYTHS AND POSSIBILITIES, 11, 15 (Sarah
Benesch ed., 1991); see generally, http://www.proenglish.org.
140. See, e.g., Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding
that the government interest in keeping its streets clean from litter did not justify a
prohibition on the distribution of hand bills on public sidewalks). Cf Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding in the Equal Protection context that "preservation of
resources" was not a legitimate reason to exclude illegal aliens from public schools,
even under rational basis review); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(recognizing that a state's valid interest in conserving public assistance resources did
not withstand an Equal Protection challenge when non-citizens were refused
services).
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security, tourism, and the compilation of census data. If the
government translates materials from all these categories into even one
other language, the cost will still represent a significant financial burden.
Furthermore, keeping a bilingual government employee from using her
language skills to serve the public is surely not conducive to
governmental efficiency. When the provisions of the law do not support
its stated purpose, the Court may delve deeper into an analysis of thet142
law's other possible purposes and reasonably-anticipated effects.
Another stated goal of the federal Official English bill is to
"preserve and enhance" the taditional role of the English language as a
unifying force in American history. 143 A bill with this purpose might
reasonably be expected to describe in detail educational programs or a
plan for additional funding for English language instruction. A
government-funded museum exhibit extolling the English language
would also satisfy the purpose of honoring the language's traditional role
in America. In fact, the bill does not specifically describe any
affirmative programs. Rather, it imposes only a vague obligation of
"encouraging greater opportunities for individuals to learn the English
language" without charging any agency to regulate this item.
144
Teaching English may be a worthwhile government goal, but that is not
what this particular legislation actually does. Instead the bill would
burden people who do not speak English, perhaps providing more
motivation for them to start speaking English, yet without providing any
means for them to do so. If Official English supporters had wanted a law
that simply established English as the traditional national language of the
United States, they could have proposed one that looked like the North
Carolina statute, 145 not one with serious enforcement implications like
the proposed federal Official English law.
141. English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997, § 3.
142. See supra note 137, at 267-68 (describing circumstances in which the
Court will analyze the context in which a law was passed in order to uncover
discriminatory intent); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
143. English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997, § 3.
144. Id.
145. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 145-12(b) (2006) (stating that "English is the
official language of the State of North Carolina").
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Furthermore, the use of the law as coercion to speak English may
not be a valid governmental purpose at all. In West Virginia State Board
v. Barnette, the Court held that a Jehovah's Witness did not have to
salute the flag, because "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
,,146
opinion . . . Using this logic, if a person wants to communicate in
Spanish, the government should not be able to stand on tradition in order
to insist that his choice is wrong or un-American. The text of the
proposed Official English law takes on a defensive tone in its protection
of the English language, 147 and one is left to wonder what exactly the
threat is and to whom. In fact, English is still the leading language in the
United States, and many immigrants report that they would like to learn
it but face obstacles to participating in a language class. 148 It does not
follow that they should be punished by a law forbidding government
employees from helping them in another language. As the Court wrote
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 149 while invalidating a state law that prohibited
grade schools from teaching foreign languages:
One claim put forward is, [sic] that the statute
forwards the work of Americanization. But in our
desire for the Americanization of our foreign born
population we should not overlook the fact that the
spirit of America is liberty and toleration-the
disposition to allow each person to live his own life
in his own way, unhampered by unreasonable and
arbitrary restrictions.
50
The dissenters in Yniguez noted that "diversity limits unity,"'
' 51
implying that a focus on ethnic identity threatens national solidarity.
Official English supporters assert that immigrants' ability to succeed in
146. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis added).
147. English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R. 997, § 3 (creating the mandate
to "preserve" the English language).
148. See OREM, supra note 97, at 4-6. See also James Leonard, Title VII and
the Protection of Minority Languages in the American Workplace: The Search for a
Justification, Mo. L. REv. 751 (Summer 2007).
149. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
150. Id. at 392.
151. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 959 (9th Cir.
1995) (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (citing Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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the United States is premised on their ability to speak English;
encouraging them to speak English is therefore helping to ensure their
economic prosperity. 52 This argument presumes that an Official English
law alone will transform people into English speakers, though it is hard
to imagine how that will happen without supportive programs to teach
them English.
If the Court extends its analysis of government intention beyond
the four comers of the document, it will find a more problematic purpose
lurking there. In particular, the issue of Official English frequently arises
in connection with the immigration debate, especially as it relates to the
influx of Spanish speakers into the United States. 53 Perhaps proponents
of Official English hope that by making the country less hospitable to
foreign language speakers, they will have a disincentive to come here-
legally or illegally.1 54 Or perhaps the movement reflects tolerance for
immigrants, but a belief that people who are already in the United States
should not have to change just because Spanish speakers are moving
here. It is not clear, however, how the individual rights of English
speakers are burdened by having Spanish speakers in the country, except
for the possible inconvenience of not being able to communicate well
with some customer service employees. Supporters of Official English
do not hide their intent to pass legislation directed at immigrants, even
saying that the law will help these individuals.155  Because the law
combines a purpose to target non-English speakers with a punitive effect
152. See, e.g., http://www.proenglish.org/issues/offeng/index.html.
153. See supra note 9 and infra notes 196 and 197, for a discussion of current
events. Most notably, the Senate approved a version of the Official English law as
part of a comprehensive immigration reform bill it passed in 2006. See also
Cartagena, supra note 139, at 16.
154. In Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Supreme Court considered a
Texas plan to exclude illegal immigrant children from the public schools. Although
the majority recognized the state's concern about illegal immigration, the Court
concluded that "[w]hile a state may have an interest in mitigating the potentially
harsh economic effects of sudden shifts in population, [this law] hardly offers an
effective method of dealing with an urgent demographic or economic problem." Id.
at 228 (alterations added). Official English is a similarly tangential way of
addressing valid concerns about illegal immigration.
155. See http://www.proenglish.org/issues/offeng/index.html (arguing that
learning English will help immigrants succeed in the United States).
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against this group, an Equal Protection challenge might also be
appropriate in this case.156
Even assuming that the law serves a compelling purpose,
severely restricting government communication with non-English
speakers does not seem to be a narrowly-tailored means of promoting the
use of English. While the Court in Ward explicitly stated that a
regulation of time, place or manner of speech did not have to represent
the least restrictive method of meeting a valid governmental goal,
nevertheless "government may not regulate expression in such a manner
that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to
advance its goals."' 157 As previously mentioned, educational programs
would seem to be a perfectly obvious, more effective, and less punitive
method for accomplishing the goal of encouraging people to speak
English. These arguments also address the reasonableness prong of the
Ward analysis. 
158
Since the private sector can still be expected to advertise in
languages such as Spanish in order to reach consumers, an Official
English law alone may not be adequate incentive to learn English at all.
People will be repeatedly unable to communicate with the government,
but some will find ways to compensate without actually becoming
English speakers, perhaps relying on their children as translators. Their
rights are no less burdened by this self-created accommodation. The
Court could therefore find that the law fails the first and second prongs
of Ward by not being reasonable or narrowly tailored to further a
significant governmental purpose. 59 Furthermore, because people who
cannot speak English will have no way of communicating directly with
the government, the third prong of the Ward test (leaving other channels
of communication open) is also fatal. 60
156. Depending on the plaintiffs, such a case might involve impermissible
discrimination based on race or national origin, which would require strict scrutiny
under Equal Protection jurisprudence. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
That discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
157. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). The Court
required a "reasonable fit" between the purpose and means of the law when
regulating commercial speech in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410,416 (1993).
158. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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C. Does the law burden democracy by chilling speech?
An Official English law would affect all American citizens, not
just illegal immigrants and others who cannot vote. 161 The government
knows that not all United States citizens speak fluent English, 62 and
Congress has even amended the Voting Rights Act to require bilingual
ballots in districts where more than five percent of potential voters speak
a particular language other than English. 63 Singling out the important
area of government affairs and prohibiting people from speaking other
languages in that context could be considered both "arbitrary and
unreasonable."' 64 It would be arbitrary because people are allowed to
speak their language of choice in virtually every other context in
America, and it would be unreasonable because people would not
automatically be able to speak English just because this law had been
passed. Their ability to communicate with the government would thus be
instantly burdened through no fault of their own. 65 Furthermore, the
United States government would function without any input or influence
from people who have not learned English, at least for a period of
time. 166
Laws that burden democratic expression are subject to
heightened scrutiny, and the Court will look to a compelling government
purpose and means that are narrowly tailored to meet that purpose.167
161. It deserves emphasis that constitutional rights other than the right to vote
extend to non-citizens as well. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886) (holding that constitutional protections are "universal in their application, to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality"). Even though non-citizens may not have a
constitutional right to participate in the American democratic process, they are still
entitled to First Amendment protection.
162. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A) (2007). This provision would be
explicitly overturned by H.R. 769, the National Language Act of 2007, § 3.
164. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 392 (1923).
165. Supporters of Official English may find culpability in the fact that people
have not yet learned English. It should be noted that people may desire to learn
English but lack the educational opportunity. This reality does not necessarily
amount to personal fault. See supra note 97.
166. A desire not to have certain groups of people participate in the democratic
process implies animus to those groups. See supra note 138.
167. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
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When the government does not provide information such that citizens
can understand it, the government simultaneously reduces opportunities
for objection and thereby burdens the freedom of speech and the
democratic process. "Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. 1 68 Under the proposed law, the
government would apparently be under no statutory obligation to listen
to citizens who are speaking a language other than English, thus
burdening their freedom of petition as well. 169 If local districts would not
have to provide bilingual ballots anymore, people's symbolic voices as
voters might also be significantly burdened, if not outright denied. Once
this burden on the democratic process is shown, a court will have to look
for a valid and compelling government purpose and narrowly-tailored
means, triggering an analysis already considered in Section III(B) of this
Note.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to be informed
about government activities is necessary to ensure a meaningful right to
the exercise of free speech. 70 Under an Official English law, however,
certain groups of citizens (as well as non-citizens) would effectively be
denied access to information about government programs and policy
decisions. Without this information, they would have no reason to form
opinions or criticize government positions.
It does not necessarily follow from this conclusion that people
will have the right to demand that all government communications be
provided in the language of their choice. 17 1  In Yniguez, the court
clarified that the Arizona Official English law infringed on an
168. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
169. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (emphasizing that the
First Amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"
means that "people may communicate their will through direct petitions to the
legislature and government officials").
170. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (quoting James Madison to support this position).
171. See National Language Act of 2007, H.R. 769, § 2, amending 4 U.S.C. §
163, which specifically states that any exception to the Official English law would
"not create a legal entitlement to additional services in that language or any language
other than English." This provision addresses the Official English movement's
disdain for the "language entitlement." See supra note 86.
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employee's "negative right" not to be gagged in serving the public; it did
not guarantee the public's right to have services in any language of their
choice."' Congress might be able to pass more specific legislation that
would create guidelines for the circumstances in which government
publications would have to be translated into other languages. For
example, Congress could specify that translation would only be required
when the number of speakers of a particular language reaches a certain
percentage of the population, a provision that would resemble the one in
the Voting Rights Act. 173  Such a law would also be more narrowly
tailored than the proposed Official English law to easing the financial
burden that translation places on government.
One federal judge, concurring in Yniguez, found Arizona's
Official English amendment invalid "because it attempts to manipulate
the political process by regulating the speech of elected officials.' 74
One of his primary concerns was that the law would control public
officials running for re-election, who would not be able to communicate
with non-English-speaking voters. "The manifest function of the First
Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be
given the widest possible latitude to express their views on issues of
policy.' ' 175 Laws that mandate a certain type of communication "pose the
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion."'
7 6
Because democracy is the absolute foundation of our
government, any law that burdens the democratic process should be
172. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir.
1995). The idea of an affirmative right to translation has been specifically rejected.
See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 929 (1984) (holding that there is no absolute right to have Social Security
services provided in Spanish). Opponents of Official English are not necessarily
arguing for an affirmative right to translation, but rather for a right not to be silenced
arbitrarily. Not having to provide services in another language is different than not
being allowed to do so.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A) (2007).
174. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 950 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
175. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135-36 (1966).
176. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (holding
unconstitutional a regulation that required cable operators to broadcast local
channels).
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given heightened scrutiny. 177 Because the Official English law does
precisely that, the courts should use this lens to find 'the law
unconstitutional. The law limits people's freedom of speech only when
interacting with the government, and thus it inherently restricts their
rights in a democracy to influence political decision-makers. It also
prohibits government officials from communicating with groups of
people who do not speak English. Since the law targets certain groups of
people and not others, it could warp the government dialogue on matters
of national and international significance. Because the Constitution, the
Supreme Court, and the nation as a whole places such a high value on
democracy, a law that burdens democratic rights should fail.
D. Is the law a reasonable regulation offederal employees in the
government workplace?
The Supreme Court has held that the government can restrict the
freedom of speech of its employees in their official capacity in ways that• . 178
it cannot restrict the speech of private citizens. The traditional
approach created in Pickering v. Board of Education was a balancing test
of the government's interest as an employer in having an effective
workplace versus the employee's interest as a citizen in his or her right to
free speech. 179  The Supreme Court's recent holding in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, ° however, places much stricter limits on the free speech
rights of government employees than Pickering did. In Garcetti, the
Court held that "when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline."' 8 1 Since the Official
English legislation would require the use of English for all official duties,
177. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 769, 786 (1978).
178. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (noting that
"the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of speech of
the citizenry in general"); see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681-82 (1994)
(remanding the case to determine whether an employee was actually fired for her
statements or for another reason).
179. 391 U.S. at 568.
180. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
181. Id. at 427.
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all those communications would be covered under Garcetti. In other
words, the speech of an employee illegally using Spanish in her official
duties would not be considered protected speech and could thus be freely
punished by her superiors, even for its content. Furthermore, since her
speech is not protected, courts would be unlikely to apply strict scrutiny
to any resulting First Amendment claims. The Garcetti decision
therefore gives government employers a green light to restrict employee
speech, unless that speech can be found to lie outside one's official
duties. 18 The inquiry into what constitutes an "official" act becomes all
the more important under the Garcetti framework."'
It is unclear to what extent the government would enforce the
law against its employees, but they would certainly be breaking the law
by using languages other than English when fulfilling their official
duties. The law could also be indiscriminately applied by government
administrators, thus leading to unpredictability in the government
workplace. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he First Amendment
prohibits the vesting of such unbridled discretion in a government
official. '  Without a clear standard of enforcement, a supervisor could
use the law to punish only the employees whom he or she did not like or
of whose opinions he or she did not approve.
Regulations of unprotected speech in a government workplace
that might also restrict protected speech may be found overly broad and
182. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Pezzolla, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13609
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2007) (distinguishing Garcetti by noting that a case manager
advocating for her clients for personal rather than job-related reasons may be acting
beyond the scope of her official duties).
183. See supra note 89, for the somewhat vague definition of "official" in H.R.
997. See also supra note 99 (describing the problem of allowing supervisors to
exercise unbridled discretion).
184. Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133
(1992) (alteration added) (concluding that an ordinance violated the First
Amendment when it gave a county administrator unrestricted discretion about
approving or denying permits for private demonstrations on public property). There
are no guidelines in the Official English legislation currently pending in Congress
about when and how the law should be enforced against government employees,
potentially leading to just the sort of arbitrary application declared invalid in Forsyth
County.
[Vol. 6
LOST WITHOUT TRANSLATION
thus unconstitutional.185 If a government employee is not certain about
whether her conversation is "official," for example, she will not know
when she can express herself in another language to a person who does
not speak English. This fear could extend to the break room and to off-
duty conversations among co-workers, amounting to an unconstitutional
"chilling" of protected personal speech. 86 Since government employees
would be confronted with this dilemma on a daily basis, the law could be
found to burden more free speech than its purpose would justify.
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,18 7 the
Court invalidated a rule prohibiting federal employees from accepting
honorarium payments for giving speeches or writing articles. The Court
invalidated the rule because it "imposes a significant burden on
expressive activity" of government employees. 188 The Court used a
balancing test of the governmental interest in workplace efficiency and
the private interest of free speech,189 but seemed to also employ the
language of strict scrutiny. "The fact that [the law] singles out
expressive activity for special regulation heightens the Government's
burden of justification."' 90 Because the government did not put forth
evidence that the targeted behavior disrupted the government workplace,
it failed to show a compelling government need that would override the
employees' interest in free speech.' 9' If the Court were to apply the
National Treasury Employees analysis in an Official English case, the
government would need to show a significant disruption to the
government workplace in order to prevail. As in Yniguez, the
government might be unable to show that bilingual employees
185. Wolf v. City of Aberdeen, 758 F. Supp. 551 (D.S.D. 1991) (holding
unconstitutional a regulation prohibiting firefighters from speaking to the media
about internal issues).
186. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 459
(1995). This restriction on personal speech actually occurred in Maldonado when
the city's Official English policy was put into practice. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
187. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 459.
188. Id. at 468.
189. Id. at 467 (using the balancing test from Pickering v. Bd of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
190. Id. at 475 (alteration added).
191. Id. at 477.
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significantly disrupt the workplace by using both their languages to
communicate with the public.
92
In this workplace analysis, the focus is on the actual functioning
of government offices and employees, not on the rights of the consuming
public. Indeed, if a government workplace is not a public forum, speech
there is not subject to extra protection. 193 Some government workplaces,
however, might be considered public forums, such as a federal agency
that is soliciting public comment in the course of an administrative
rulemaking. Under the Official English law, the agency would
presumably be under no obligation to solicit or read comments in
languages other than English, even if the issue squarely affects non-
English speakers. Similarly, any federal employee whose job involves
interacting with the public would only have to offer information to
people who speak English. "Speech touches a matter of public concern
if the community that constitutes the speaker's audience has an interest
in receiving that speech."' 194  Since some citizens would certainly be
interested in receiving information from the government in these
contexts, the speech here could be considered a matter of public concern,
sometimes taking place in a public forum, and thus afforded greater
protection under the First Amendment. 
195
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court may soon have to address the
constitutionality of laws enacted to establish Official English, as
governmental actors are starting to embrace this concept in serious ways.
In May 2006, for example, the Senate voted to support Official English
192. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 942 (9th Cir.
1995).
193. See, e.g., Israel v. Abate, 949 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that a correctional facility was not a public forum, and government employees there
were not speaking on a matter of public concern).
194. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 951 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
195. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (setting forth the
standard that speech is a matter of public concern when it "relates to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community," warranting greater protection in
the public employment context).
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as an amendment to its immigration reform bill. 196 During a presidential
debate in September 2007, adding a twist to the Official English issue,
Democratic candidate Dennis Kucinich proposed that Spanish be named
the second national language.197  The Official English movement
generates a fascinating debate about whether a person has a First
Amendment right to speak in the language of his or her choice, and if so,
what the limits of that right might be. Even if federal employees' speech
rights are left with less protection after Garcetti, certainly the
Constitution still protects a private individual's freedom of speech and
the right to participate in the American democracy.
Encouraging people to learn English may be a reasonable
governmental goal, but the means employed here are unconstitutional
under the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech. As the
Supreme Court has stated:
The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to
those who speak other languages as well as to those
born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would
be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this
cannot be coerced by methods that conflict with the
Constitution-a desirable end cannot be promoted
by prohibited means. 98
Because an Official English law is not an effective means of
ensuring that the public uses English, but is rather a burden on the
freedom of speech of targeted groups, it is unconstitutional both on its
face and as applied under the First Amendment.
196. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, 109th Cong., S. 2611,
§ 767 (2006). This bill was passed by the Senate but did not become law.
197. Patrick Healy, In Miami, Democrats Reach Out to Hispanic Voters, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, at A23. It is unclear whether Kucinich was also supporting
English as the official language or was assuming it already was.
198. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
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